The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. The trial court certified its order at Frink’s request, and we accepted jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. She also claimed that the School Corporation’s no-trespass warning violated her substantive and procedural due process rights. Specifically, Frink alleged that she cannot be guilty of criminal trespass because she had a contractual interest in School Corporation property by virtue of her status as a parent of children living within the school system.
#Judge frink procedures code#
Frink filed a motion to dismiss the charge pursuant to Indiana Code Section (a)(5). In fall 2014, Frink entered onto the property of Coulston Elementary School, part of the School Corporation, and the State subsequently charged her with level 6 felony criminal trespass. In addition to terminating Frink’s employment, the School Corporation instructed the Shelbyville Police Department to issue a criminal trespass warning to Frink advising her that she was prohibited from coming onto all School Corporation property. Case Summary In spring 2014, the Shelbyville Central School Corporation (the “School Corporation”) terminated the employment of Jennifer Frink after an eighteenyear-old male student alleged that he and Frink, a secretary at Shelbyville High Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 73A05-1507-CR-761 | Ma of 11 School, were having an inappropriate sexual relationship. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff Appeal from the Shelby Superior Court The Honorable David N. Frink, MaAppellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. Zoeller Attorney General of Indiana Ian McLean Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA Jennifer L. FILED Mar 24 2016, 9:52 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Brian J.
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